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Ill. INTRODUCTION 
The Idaho Supreme Court ("Court") exercises free review over questions of law interpreted 
by the Idaho Industrial Commission ("Commission"). Recognizing that this standard of review grants 
no deference to the Commission's interpretation of statutes or case law, the defendants have 
characterized this appeal as one in which the claimant is merely asking to Court to re-weigh the 
evidence. However, the claimant is simply asking the Court to determine if the Commission properly 
applied LC. §72-439 when it concluded that claimant's occupational disease claim was not 
compensable. Notably absent from the Commission's decision, as well as the defendants' briefing 
on appeal, was any discussion of the Sundquist case, which is critical to any discussion regarding LC. 
§72-439 in an occupational disease claim. 
Specifically, the Commission stated that the claimant needed to prove both colonization and 
infection with :MR.SA while working for the employer to make a successful occupational disease 
claim. R. p. 85-86. However, this finding is contrary to the guidance in Sundquist interpreting LC. 
§72-439(1) which states it is possible for a disease to be "incurred" by a claimant under a series of 
different employers before it becomes manifest. Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 
Idaho 450,456, 111 P.3d 135, 141 (2005). If this were not the case, any occupational disease claim 
could be easily defeated if it involved a claimant who worked for more than one employer, as the 
surety would always argue the disease was incurred with a prior employer in an attempt to avoid 
responsibility. It was for this reason that LC. §72-439(3) explicitly sets out that in such a case, "the 
surety on the risk for the employer, in whose employment the employee was last injuriously 
exposed to the hazard of such disease, shall be liable therefor." 
It follows that utilizing the framework set out above, it was improper for the 
Commission to require the claimant to prove both MRSA colonization and infection while 
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employed by Dime Clinic/Heritage Health ("Heritage Health"). Instead, the Commission 
should have only required the claimant to prove injurious exposure to MRSA at Heritage 
Health as the Commission already concluded that, "The weight of the evidence has shown 
that Claimant is at increased risk for MRSA colonization due to his profession, and that his 
infection began while working for Employer." R. p. 85, ,r47. While there was no discussion 
of injurious exposure as the term is used in I.C. §72-439(3) in the Commission decision in 
this case, in an earlier decision from January 2011, the Commission clarified the standard 
used when interpreting "last injurious exposure" when it stated: 
The Commission concludes that in order for the last injurious exposure rule to apply, it 
must first be demonstrated that the employment in question did in fact expose the injured 
worker to the hazard of contracting the occupational disease at issue. Next, in order for that 
employer to be held liable under the last injurious exposure rule, it must be demonstrated 
that the hazard to which the injured worker was exposed actually did contribute, however 
slightly, to the development of the disease, and Claimant's eventual disability. In the Matter 
of Murray Burns, Decedent Marelyn Burns, Claimant, IC 2010-003881, 2011 WL 
344594, at *11 (Idaho Ind. Com. Jan. 4, 2011) (emphasis added). 
With this additional background concerning the proper application of I.C. §72-439 as previously 
discussed in Sundquist and Burns, it becomes clear that the. Commission incorrectly applied the 
law in this case, requiring a remand back to the Commission for further findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
1. The Commission erred as a matter of law in requiring Claimant to prove 
MRSA colonization and MRSA infection while working for Employer 
In the present case, the Commission was unnecessarily focused on a need for the claimant to 
prove MRSA colonization at Heritage Health. R. p. 85-86. Specifically, the Commission found that: 
There is no evidence to suggest that Claimant was colonized with MRSA within eight months 
of his infection, to the exclusion of his former employment. (For example, there is no 
evidence that Claimant was checked for MRSA at the time he was employed by Employer, 
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and found to be MR.SA free.) Each of Claimant's past employments since 2009 carried the 
risk of colonization." R. p. 85, ,r48. 
[I]t cannot be said that Claimant has produced evidence which established that it was more 
probable than not that he was colonized and infected with MR.SA while working for Employer 
from October 2012 through June 2013. While certainly not all of the above listed events are 
equally likely to have been the culprit for Claimant's MRSA infection, only one event-
Claimant's employment with Employer-would allow Claimant to obtain compensation 
under Idaho worker's compensation statutes. R. p. 86, ,r49. 
This focus on proving colonization with MR.SA at Heritage Health is contrary to the entire concept 
of occupational disease claims for health care workers, where it frequently takes years during which 
numerous job changes occur, before a worker is diagnosed with an occupational disease. See CE 2, 
p. 8-14. In this situation, it is important to recall that an occupational disease claim does not arise 
until it first manifests. See Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450, 454, 111 
P.3d 135, 139 (2005). Moreover, because in Idaho's worker's compensation law the word 
"incurred" means" 'arising out of and in the course of employment," it is as much a reference to 
cause as to a particular point in time. See I.C. § 72-102(21)(b). Accordingly, as an occupational 
disease develops over time, it is possible for the disease to be "incurred" by a claimant under a 
series of different employers before it becomes manifest. See Sundquist v. Precision Steel & 
Gypsum, Inc., 141 Idaho 450,456, 111 P.3d 135, 141 (2005). 
In this case, it is clear that claimant's MRSA infection manifested while claimant was 
employed at Heritage Health and the Commission explicitly made this finding of fact when it 
stated, "The weight of the evidence demonstrated that the claimant was at increased risk for MRSA 
colonization due to his profession, and that his infection began while working for the employer." 
R. p. 85, ,r47. When the Commission's finding that the claimant was at increased risk for 
MRSA colonization due to his profession was combined with the finding of manifestation of 
the MRSA infection at Heritage Health, it became completely unnecessary for the 
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Commission to conduct an inquiry as to whether claimant could have been colonized with 
MRSA in a prior employment. This error of law was then compounded when the Commission 
utilized the lack of certainty regarding whether the MRSA colonization occurred with a prior 
employer as a factor in a causation analysis. R. 85-86, ,I49. That the Commission failed to 
mention Sundquist in its decision is telling as to how far astray the Commission ventured from 
established case law. 
A useful case illustrating the proper application of LC. §72-439(3) where an occupational 
disease is "incurred" by a series of employers as discussed in Sundquist before it manifests is In 
the Matter of Murray Burns, Decedent Marelyn Burns, Claimant, IC 2010-003881, 2011 WL 
344594. In that case, the claimant made an occupational disease claim for pleural mesothelioma. 
While the defendants agreed that claimant suffered from an occupational disease, they asserted 
that they were not liable for the claim due to application of LC. §72-439(3). As a result, the 
Commission undertook a study of what standard various jurisdictions utilized to interpret the "last 
injurious exposure" rule contained in LC. §72-439 before determining that: 
The Commission concludes that in order for the last injurious exposure rule to apply, it 
must first be demonstrated that the employment in question did in fact expose the injured 
worker to the hazard of contracting the occupational disease at issue. Next, in order for that 
employer to be held liable under the last injurious exposure rule, it must be demonstrated 
that the hazard to which the injured worker was exposed actually did contribute, however 
slightly, to the development of the disease, and Claimant's eventual disability. In the 
Matter of Murray Burns, Decedent Marelyn Burns, Claimant, IC 2010-003 8 81, 2011 WL 
344594, at* 11 (Idaho Ind. Com. Jan. 4, 2011) (emphasis added). 
A lengthy discussion of the various levels of proof required to show "last injurious exposure" is 
discussed in Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Montana State Fund, 2009 MT 386, 353 Mont. 299, 219 
P .3d 1267 (2009), mentioned in the Burns case. In Liberty, the Supreme Court of Montana adopted 
a "potentially causal" standard when utilizing the last injurious exposure rule: 
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Under this approach, the claimant who has sustained an OD and was arguably exposed to 
the hazard of an OD among two or more employers is not required to prove the degree to 
which working conditions with each given employer have actually caused the OD in order 
to attribute initial liability. Instead, the claimant must present objective medical evidence 
demonstrating that he has an OD and that the working conditions during the employment 
at which the last injurious exposure was alleged to occur, were the type and kind of 
conditions which could have caused the OD. Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Montana State 
Fund, 2009 MT 386, ,r 24, 353 Mont. 299,308,219 P.3d 1267, 1273, (2009). 
It is believed that the issue of which standard to use when utilizing the last injurious exposure rule 
may be an issue of first impression in Idaho. If the Court addresses this issue, when determining 
whether to adopt the "potentially causal" standard or the standard currently utilized by the 
Commission in Burns, the claimant requests that the Court consider the purpose of the workers' 
compensation law to provide sure and certain relief and liberally construe LC. §72-439(3) in favor 
of the claimant, by adopting a "potentially causal" standard as utilized by neighboring states Oregon 
and Montana. 
However, regardless of the standard utilized to interpret the last injurious exposure rule, it 
is necessary that this case be remanded to the Commission for further findings given the 
Commission's legal error that required the claimant to prove MRSA colonization at Heritage 
Health in direct contravention of LC. §72-439 as previously interpreted in Sundquist. On remand 
to the Commission, it should be recognized that the unrebutted evidence in this case demonstrates 
that the claimant's only known MRSA exposure was the claimant's last injurious exposure when 
he treated MRSA colonized patients at Heritage Health, for weeks both before and after the cat 
scratch referenced in the Commission's decision, as stated by claimant's nurse Deborah Gutierrez, 
rendering this a compensable occupational disease claim. R. p. 82, ,r39; CE 7, p. 53; CE 25, p. 2514. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
It is the policy of worker's compensation statutes to encourage "sure and certain relief for 
injured workers." I.C. §72-201. The provisions of the Workers Compensation law are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the employee. Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho 720, 779 
P.2d 395 (1989). The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow technical 
construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759 (1996). 
Based on the argument presented herein, this case should be remanded to the Industrial 
Commission with instructions to reconsider the evidence in accordance with proper application of 
the law as set out in I.C. §72-439 and subsequent case law interpreting that statute to include 
Sundquist. The Commission should then determine on a more likely than not basis whether the 
Claimant was last irtjuriously exposed to MRSA while treating patients at Heritage Health, instead 
of requiring the Claimant to prove both MRSA colonization and MRSA infection during the period 
he was employed at Heritage Health. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMIITTED this 19th day of April, 2017. 
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Attorney for Claimant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of April , 2017, two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing document were served upon the following individuals by the 
method indicated below: 
H. James Magnuson 
1250 Northwood Center Court 
P.O. Box 2288 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Attorney for Respondent 
X Mailed Mailed 
By Hand By Hand 
Overnight Mail Overnight Mail 
Fax: 666-1700 Fax 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF -7 
